Simplicity Theory
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by Jean-Louis Dessalles
(created
2008.12.31)
(updated 2010.02.18)
Prominent places are simple and make events more unexpected
Consider the prominence of places. A
man jumps from a hotel window. News? Yes, but vastly more so if he leaps from
the top of the Eiffel Tower, the Washington Monument, the Statue of Liberty or
Niagara falls. An event in an ordinary house is less likely to see print than
an event in the White House.
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22 July 2003: a minor
blaze in an electrical cabinet at the third floor of the Events happening close to
prominent places are more unexpected and thus more newsworthy. Why? And how
much more? |
By definition, unexpectedness is the difference
between generation complexity and description complexity: Cw – C.
The computation of
description complexity may go through the computation
sequence L*l, where L is a prominent landmark and l is the location of the unexpected situation (event). We may write:
C(l) < C(L*l)
= C(L) + C(l|L)
The computation of C(l|L) is the same as for the "next
door effect". Simply, the distance dL to the landmark is used instead of egocentric distance. We get:
C(l|L) = log2(
dL2/a)
where a
is the area of the event itself. More generally, if the event occurs within a
spatiotemporal volume vL centred on L, then the complexity of l
relative to L amounts to:
C(l|L)
= log2 (vL/a)
As for the "next door effect", Cw(l) = log2 (Ve/a). We eventually get:
U(l) >
log2 (Ve/vL) – C(L)
This formula predicts when a
landmark will be used, and which one will be chosen if there are several
available ones. The best spatial landmark in two dimensions, L0, makes C(L)
+ 2 log(dL)
minimum:
L0 = argmin[ C(L) + 2 log(dL)
]
ego
can be included in the set of candidate landmarks, with complexity equal to
zero. In two dimensions, landmarks behave like Newtonian attractors, as their
influence on improbability (through formula p=2–U)
decreases as the square of the distance to them. Their area of influence varies
like 2–C(L).

This
picture shows a map of
Dessalles, J-L. (2007). Spontaneous
assessment of complexity in the selection of events. Technical
Report ParisTech-ENST 2007D011.
Dessalles, J-L. (2008). Coincidences
and the encounter problem: A formal account. In B. C. Love, K. McRae &
V. M. Sloutsky (Eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science
Society, 2134-2139. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Dessalles,
J-L. (2008). La pertinence et ses origines cognitives -
Nouvelles théories.
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